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Abstract—The research community has proposed numerous
techniques to perform security-oriented analyses based on a
software design model. Such a formal analysis can provide precise
security guarantees to the software designer, and facilitate the
discovery of subtle flaws. Nevertheless, using such techniques in
practice poses a big challenge for the average software designer,
due to the narrow scope of each technique, the heterogeneous
set of modelling languages that are required, and the analysis
results that are often hard to interpret. Within the course of our
research, we intend to provide practitioners with an integrated,
easy-to-use modelling and analysis environment that enables them
to work on a broad range of common security concerns without
leaving the software design’s level of abstraction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing secure software is still a daunting task with con-
siderable pitfalls. To be successful, security concerns should be
considered right from the start of the development process, in-
cluding the design phase. The research community has recog-
nized this, and has produced an elaborate set of methodologies
that embody this security by design principle. In earlier work,
we have evaluated the state of the art regarding this topic with
a systematic literature review [1], focussing on the possibilities
for modelling and analysing security concerns at the design
level. We have found that most existing methodologies support
modelling only a small number of concerns, usually access
control, and they offer limited support for analysis.
Based on these results, we identify the need for a new
methodology that enables the designer to model security
solutions for a broad range of concerns, and that offers
precise, formal analysis techniques for the created models.
In particular, our research goal is to provide a methodology,
which should have the following three characteristics.
First, the methodology should offer an adequate represen-
tation of security concepts in software design models. This en-
tails that the designer should be given the possibility to create a
security-specific model using concepts at an appropriate level
of abstraction. These models should offer support for a broad,
integrated set of security concerns. Furthermore, the designer
should be encouraged to reuse existing, well-known security
solutions as much as possible. This can be achieved by offering
a catalogue of common security concerns and solutions, based
on best practices or security standards, for example.
Second, the methodology should enable precise, formal
analysis of the security concerns of these models. Because
existing verification techniques already exist, they should be
reused as much as possible. The underlying details of the
analysis should nevertheless remain invisible to the designer.
Finally, after performing an analysis, the results of this
analysis should be meaningful to the designer. This means
that the output from the analysis tools must be translated back
to the model’s level of abstraction, so that it can be easily
understood by the designer. Additionally, the analysis results
may be used to further enrich the security model with relevant
information and constraints that are necessary to provide the
desired security guarantees.
II. RELATED WORK
Methodologies that support the analysis of software designs
can be roughly divided into two groups.
The first group contains methodologies that require the
designer to explicitly specify the property to analyse, allowing
for an unlimited set of properties. Within this group, some
methodologies rely only on common design languages such
as UML and OCL. For instance, in SecureUML [2], designers
specify their desired role-based access control (RBAC) proper-
ties as OCL queries executed against UML-based designs aug-
mented with a formal OCL foundation. Sohr et al. [3] and Yu
et al. [4] verify possible system states against OCL constraints
that express RBAC properties. Other methodologies rely on
notations besides the design languages. For example, UML
AC [5] formalises the semantics of access control policies and
properties using graphs. Xu and Nygard [6] and Kong et al. [7]
formalise integrity threats using respectively graph grammars
and Petri nets. Methodologies can also rely on external tools
to perform the analysis. For example, Georg et al. [8] and
AMF [9] employ Alloy to analyse respectively authentication
and authorisation properties.
The second group contains methodologies that provide a
pre-defined set of properties to analyse. UMLsec [10] allows
designers to annotate their design with a range of properties
and employs formal tools to analyse these designs. Unfortu-
nately, UMLsec provides no guidance to the designer while
annotating his or her design. Another example is Buyens
et al. [11], who use set theory to detect least privilege and
separation of duty violations.
The above methodologies do not provide means to reuse
well-known security solutions. Nevertheless, such reuse is very
common in software development, with patterns [12], [13]
being a well known example. Uzunov et al. [14] survey a
number of design methodologies that reuse security patterns.
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Figure 1. A birds-eye-view of our security analysis methodology.
FDAF [15] provides an aspect repository containing, for
example, aspects modelling RBAC and data origin authentica-
tion. Unfortunately, these methodologies barely offer security
analysis of the created designs.
Heyman [16] combines security patterns with formal mod-
elling, to allow designers to both reuse the patterns while
providing the possibility to analyse their resulting designs.
This methodology requires a background in both security and
formal modelling, and provides only the set of patterns as
guidance to mitigate discovered security violations.
Our methodology aims at combining formal analysis with
the reuse of common security knowledge, while minimizing
the required skills of the designer. The structure of our knowl-
edge catalogue is partially inspired by the goal refinement and
formalisation techniques from the KAOS [17] requirements
engineering methodology.
III. PROPOSAL
From a birds-eye-view, our proposed methodology consists
of four main elements (Figure 1): (1) a vocabulary which
defines the common concepts that are used by the other three
elements; (2) a catalogue that primarily consists of security
concerns, corresponding solutions, strategies, and low-level
facts; (3) a modeller through which the designer works with
security-specific models; and (4) a verifier that analyses the
models and generates feedback for the designer. The remainder
of this section discusses each of these elements in detail.
In practice, the designer creates a security and attacker
model using the modeller, based on the security concerns,
solutions and strategies from the catalogue. The designer’s
choices determine the low-level facts that need to be verified.
The verifier, hidden from the designer, transforms the models,
together with these facts, into a verification model which
is then automatically verified according to a specific formal
approach. Afterwards, the verification result is transformed
back into feedback that is meaningful to the designer and can
be incorporated back into the security model.
A. Vocabulary
The vocabulary provides a common theory for the rest of
the methodology. It comprises the terminology and the cor-
responding semantics, and acts as the glue between the other
elements. For example, the vocabulary should define what a
cryptographic hash function is. The catalogue, modeller and
verifier must then all treat hashing according to this common
definition. Otherwise, it could happen that the verification
result does not apply to the security model, for instance.
B. Catalogue
The catalogue is instrumental in our methodology in that it
bundles the analysable security concerns and relates them to
automatically verifiable facts. This enables designers to select
predefined security concerns, which are closely related to
common security requirements, instead of manually specifying
the desired properties by hand. To achieve this, the elements
in the catalogue are defined as templates. In this text, we
represent a template parameter as <parameter>. The elements
of the catalogue are spread over three levels of abstraction,
namely high, medium and low (cf. Catalogue in Figure 1).
Security concerns populate the highest level. They are
derived from standards such as [18] and [19]. An example is
the storage confidentiality concern, which states that <data>
is stored confidentially on <persistent storage>.
Solutions and strategies are practical means for achieving
a security concern, and occupy the medium level in the cata-
logue. A solution can consist of multiple strategies, combined
using the logical AND/OR operators. Security patterns [13]
can be used as a basis for populating the catalogue with
specific solutions and strategies. For example, enforcing access
control is a solution to the storage confidentiality concern
above. It involves of two strategies, authentication and au-
thorisation, which must both be implemented (AND).
Finally, facts inhabit the lowest level. A correctly imple-
mented strategy must satisfy all of its facts. For example, the
authorisation strategy must satisfy both authenticate first (a
user must be authenticated before he or she can be authorised)
and authorise before access (the user must be authorised
before accessing the persistent storage).
Only verifying facts obviously does not provide any formal
guarantees about the fulfilment of the corresponding strategy,
solution and security concern. This can only be attained if
each relation in the catalogue is proven sound. More specif-
ically, it must be proven that the set of facts associated to a
strategy are sufficient to implement that strategy, and that the
combination of strategies achieves the corresponding solution.
Finally, each solution must actually solve the concerns to
which it is associated. To allow for such proofs, all elements
in the catalogue are accompanied by formal specification, e.g.
in linear-time temporal logic, based on the concepts in the
vocabulary. Experts must write such proofs once, after which
they can be re-used.
Since the security landscape always evolves, the catalogue
must allow extensions with new elements and corresponding
proofs.
C. Modeller
The modeller provides a domain-specific language (DSL)
allowing the designer to create security and attacker models.
A security model is a model of the software that contains only
the security-relevant elements. For example, when analysing
confidential storage, it should only include the locations that
store the data in question, and the elements that act on that
data, e.g. by encrypting it.
The attacker model associates the abilities of the attacker
with each element of the security model. For example, an
attacker can remove messages from a certain connection
but cannot read or add messages. Furthermore, an attacker
model also describes the initial attacker knowledge, e.g. the
possession of a certain cryptographic key.
The modeller also receives feedback from the verifier.
Such feedback, for example, shows violations of the security
concern, or identifies the design elements that are crucial for
achieving the security concern.
D. Verifier
The verifier automatically transforms the security and at-
tacker models, and the formal definitions of the facts, to a
verification model. An off-the shelf tool (e.g. a model checker,
automated theorem prover, or any already existing security
analysis tool) verifies this model and returns a verification
result. Our only requirement on such a tool is that it does
not need manual interaction. The result of the tool must be
transformed back to feedback meaningful to the designer,
hence in terms of the security and attacker models.
Adding a new tool as verifier requires specifying two
transformations. A first transformation to create a verification
model in the correct language and a second one to convert the
verification result to feedback. Both transformations require a
proof that their output preserves the semantics of their input.
IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT
To show the viability of our methodology, we have devel-
oped a proof of concept, including a tool built on top of the
Eclipse framework, that supports a small subset (storage confi-
dentiality) of the envisioned catalogue (Figure 2). We explain
our proof of concept using a simplistic online store example,
in which customers can create an account that contains their
credit card number. Furthermore, for accountability reasons,
the store logs every change to a customer profile.
The designer creates a security model (Figure 3) for the
online store using our drag-and-drop editor based on Sir-
ius [20]. The credit card numbers are transmitted between the
elements according to the connections drawn between them.
Both AccountDB and LogDB store credit card numbers
persistently (indicated by the Storage role in Figure 3).
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Figure 2. Example catalogue containing the storage confidentiality concern.
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Figure 3. The security model for the online store, red coloured elements
indicate the violation.
Our example requires the storage confidentiality concern
mentioned earlier. Instantiating this concern results in the re-
quirement that a <credit card number> is stored confidentially
on <AccountDB> and <LogDB>.
Assume that the designer selects the no persistent plain
text solution to resolve this concern. This solution comprises
four alternative strategies, each of them associated to one fact.
Therefore, the verifier will need to prove that at least one of
these four facts is true for every storage location. The designer
follows the encrypted storage strategy, and specifies that
AccountDBMgr encrypts the credit card numbers, indicated
by the Encryptor role (Figure 3), before storing them.
Currently we have not defined an attacker model DSL in our
proof of concept. Therefore, we assume an implicit attacker
model in which the attacker is only able to read from all
persistent storage.
In our proof of concept, we use the Spin model checker [21]
to perform the verification. The security model, implicit at-
tacker model, and the facts mentioned above, are transformed
to a verification model, which here takes the form of a Promela
file. The result of running Spin is a trail that indicates that the
verification model violates the facts. This trail is transformed
back to the corresponding flow through the elements of the
security model, which are highlighted in red by the modeller
(Figure 3). The feedback indicates that LogDB stores the credit
card data as plain text, which violates the original concern.
To remedy this violation, the designer must also apply one
of the available solutions to the violating path. The designer
decides to apply the no persistent plain text solution again, but
now by implementing the truncated storage strategy. This is
achieved by adding an element capable of truncating data in
front of the LogDB. Repeating the analysis returns no more
violations, indicating that the model satisfies the concern.
As a side note, we recognize that the violation in this simple
example was trivial to spot without performing any formal
analysis, but for realistic, more complex models, we believe
that automated support quickly becomes essential to ensure
that a system adheres to its security requirements.
V. GOING FORWARD
In the first part of our research, we have systematically
surveyed the state of the art concerning support for modelling
and analysis of security at the software design level [1]. Based
on the gaps that emerged from this survey, we have outlined
the important characteristics of a practical security analysis
methodology, and we have provided a proof of concept of
such a methodology. In the remainder of our research track, we
intend to gradually convert this proof of concept into a mature
methodology, which will involve a diverse set of activities.
Currently, our catalogue only supports a small subset of the
intended security concerns, and will be extended with new
security concerns. Also, the relationships between the elements
in the catalogue and the transformations performed by the
verifier needs to be proven correct and sound. Although the
methodology is perfectly usable without such proofs, it would
not provide any formal guarantees about the correctness of the
analysis results. As a requirement to construct these proofs, the
common vocabulary must be explicitly formalised.
Furthermore, we intend to increase the level of detail of
both the models and the provided analysis. First of all this
involves replacing the currently implicit attacker with an
explicit attacker model, in which the developer can define
the abilities of the intended attacker enabling a more fine-
tuned analysis. Besides that, additional information about the
elements in the catalogue should be specified and taken into
account. For example, merely modelling that data is encrypted
provides only a limited amount of information; other factors,
such as the algorithm, are worth considering as well. This
will require extensions to the modeller and catalogue, and the
addition of new verifiers.
Simultaneously, we want to expand the feedback offered to
the designer beyond merely signalling that the concern is sat-
isfied or a violation was found. For example, the designer can
be assisted with resolving the violations by presenting (or even
automatically applying) possible resolutions. Furthermore, to
guide the further development of the system, the security
model can be annotated with conditions that are essential to
preserve the security of the design.
Orthogonal to the aforementioned aspects, our methodology
must be thoroughly evaluated to provide evidence that it
actually helps software designers. Hence, we need to evaluate
the methodology when executed by actual practitioners. One
option for such an evaluation is a controlled empirical user
study where students play the role of the practitioners. Such
empirical studies have already been successfully performed
within our research group in the past [22], [23], [24], showing
that they are a both feasible and useful evaluation method.
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